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HEALTHCARE ADVOCATES, INC., V. HARDING,
EARLEY, FOLLMER & FRAILEY
49 7 F. SUPP. 2D 62 7 (E.D. PA. 200 7)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Healthcare Advocates, Inc., v. Harding, Earley, Follmer &
Frailey, Healthcare Advocates ("Healthcare") filed suit against
Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, ("Harding") in the United
States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, claiming
that Harding (1) infringed on Healthcare's copyright by viewing
and printing Healthcare's copyrighted material, (2) violated the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") by circumventing
Healthcare's security measures, (3) violated the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act ("CFAA") by exceeding its authorized access to a
protected computer, and (4) is liable under Pennsylvania common
law for conversion and trespass to chattel.'
The District Court held that Harding did not infringe upon
Healthcare's copyright because Harding's viewing and printing of
Healthcare's copyrighted material fell under the fair use doctrine.2
Moreover, the court held that Harding did not violate the DMCA
by circumventing Healthcare's technology measure because a
server malfunction allowed Harding access to Healthcare's
material.3 The court also held that Harding did not intentionally
exceed its authorized access to a protected computer in violation of
the CFAA.4 The court reasoned that Harding viewed Healthcare's
material by using a public website in the manner the site was
intended to be used.' The court also held that Healthcare could not
bring state law claims for conversion and trespass to chattel
1. Healthcare Advocates, Inc., v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F.
Supp. 2d 627, 633 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
2. Id. at 642.
3. Id. at 646.
4. Id. at 649.
5. Id. at 648.
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because federal copyright law preempted these claims.6
II. BACKGROUND
Healthcare is an organization that assists patients in dealing with
their healthcare providers.' In June 2003, Healthcare filed suit
against a competitor for trademark infringement.8 Defendant,
Harding, is a law firm that specializes in intellectual property cases
and represented Healthcare's competitor in the 2003 suit.9
During the pre-discovery phase, Harding used a website called
the Wayback Machine to view what Healthcare's website looked
like prior to the 2003 suit.'° The Wayback Machine would scan
websites on a daily basis, take screenshots of those websites, and
archive the screenshots into a database." Users of the Wayback
Machine entered a website's address, and the Wayback Machine
would return a list of dates with each date linking to a screenshot
of how the website appeared on the specified date.12 Harding
viewed and printed archived screenshots of Healthcare's websites
and used these images to defend its client in the 2003 suit.'3
Healthcare implemented a security measure called a robots.txt
protocol to prevent website applications like the Wayback
Machine from archiving Healthcare's websites. 4 The protocol is
enabled by configuring a website to include a robots.txt file. '
When website applications like the Wayback Machine scan a
website, the robots.txt file informs the application to deny the
public from viewing any existing archived files.' 6
After implementing the robots.txt protocol, Healthcare assumed
that archived images of its websites would be unavailable to the
6. Id. at 650.
7. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The Wayback Machine is a tool operated by the Internet Archive.
See Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org (last visited January 31, 2008).
11. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 631.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 630.
14. Id. at631.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 632.
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public.' 7 However, on the dates that Harding used the Wayback
Machine, the Wayback Machine servers malfunctioned and failed
to recognize the robots.txt command. 8 Thus, some archived
screenshots of Healthcare's website were not denied from public
viewing, enabling Harding to view and print copies of
Healthcare's past websites.' 9
Healthcare filed suit in the United States District Court, Eastern
District of Pennsylvania claiming that (1) Harding infringed on
Healthcare's copyright by viewing and printing the screenshots of
Healthcare's website, (2) Harding violated the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA") by circumventing Healthcare's
robots.txt protocol, (3) Harding violated the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act ("CFAA") by intentionally exceeding its authorized
access to the Wayback Machine, and (4) Harding is liable under
Pennsylvania common law for conversion and trespass to chattel.20
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The United States District Court, Eastern District of
Pennsylvania addressed Healthcare's suit in four parts: (1) whether
Harding's viewing and printing of Healthcare's past websites fell
under the fair use doctrine, (2) whether Harding circumvented
Healthcare's technology measure, (3) whether Harding
intentionally exceeded their authorized access when using the
Wayback Machine, and (4) whether Healthcare's state law claims
for conversion and trespass to chattels are preempted by federal
copyright law.2
A. Harding's Viewing and Printing of Healthcare's Copyrighted
Material Was Fair Use
First, the court held that Healthcare possessed a valid copyright
and that Harding's viewing and printing of Healthcare's material
17. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 632.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 633.
21. See id.
2007] 223
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fell under the fair use doctrine.22
The court began by holding that Harding infringed on
Healthcare's copyright. 23  To determine infringement, the court
looked to (1) whether Healthcare had ownership of a valid
copyright and (2) whether Harding copied, displayed, or
distributed material that was protected by Healthcare's copyright.24
The court found that Healthcare had a valid copyright to its
website because Healthcare had registered the website with the
Copyright Office. 25  The court ruled that public display of a
copyrighted work involved showing a copy of the work "either
directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other
device ... ."" The court reasoned that Harding infringed on
Healthcare's right of public display because Harding employees,
while using the Wayback Machine, displayed archived images of
Healthcare's website on their office computers.27 Moreover,
because Harding employees printed copies of the images, Harding
infringed upon Healthcare's right to reproduce its copyrighted
material.28
After determining that Harding infringed on Healthcare's
copyright, the court held that Harding's viewing and printing of
Healthcare's protected material was fair use. 29 To determine fair
use, the court applied a four factor test that examined (1) "the
purpose and character of the use," (2) "the nature of the
copyrighted work," (3) "the amount and substantiality of the
portion of the copyrighted work used," and (4) the effect of
Harding's use "upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work."3
Under the first fair use factor, the "purpose and character of the
infringing use," the court found that Harding's public display and
reproduction of Healthcare's material favored a finding of fair
22. Id. at 635, 639.
23. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 635-36.
24. Id. at 635.
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
27. Id. at 635.
28. Id. at 636.
29. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 639.
30. Id. at 634-35.
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use.3' The court looked to whether Harding's use was commercial
or educational in nature. Moreover, the court ruled that a finding
of commercial use is less favorable than an educational use.33 The
court found that Harding's viewing and printing of Healthcare's
copyrighted material was primarily to represent its clients.34 The
court reasoned that because Harding profits from representing
clients in litigation, Harding's use was commercial.35
Despite Harding's commercial use, the court characterized
Harding's public display of Healthcare's material as fair use.36
The court looked to whether Harding had shown the images to a
group outside the "family circle."37 For example, website owners
infringe a copyright owner's display rights when copyrighted
material is made available on a public website without the
copyright owner's consent.38 Thus, the copyrighted material is
shown to the public, a group that is outside of the website owner's
family or acquaintances.39 Unlike the website owner, Harding
displayed Healthcare's material inside Harding's office and was
shown only to a small group of other Harding employees.4" The
court reasoned that Harding's use was not a showing to a group
outside a "family circle" and thus favored a finding of fair use.4
In addition to Harding's public display, the court also found that
Harding had a legitimate purpose to print Healthcare's material.42
Harding's reproduction of the copyrighted material was used to
defend its client in a trademark and copyright infringement suit.43
The court reasoned that it would be an "absurd result" if an
attorney representing a client in an infringement case would be
31. Id. at637.
32. Id. at 636.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 636.
36. Id. at 636-37.
37. Id. at 637.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
42. Id.
43. Id.
2007]
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denied access from using material that was publicly available."
Under the second fair use factor, the court found that the nature
of Healthcare's copyrighted material also favored a finding of fair
use.45  The court found that Healthcare's material was
informational in nature because the website was used to promote
and market Healthcare's services. 46 The court reasoned that the
purpose of Healthcare's copyright was to prevent competitors from
copying Healthcare's website in order to make free use of
Healthcare's marketing tools. 47  Because the "ultimate goal of
copyright law is to increase [the public's] fund of information" and
because Healthcare's material is informational in nature, the court
found that the second factor favored a finding of fair use.48
Under the third fair use factor, the court found that the amount
and substantiality of Healthcare's material that Harding viewed
and printed was justified under the fair use doctrine. 49 Harding
viewed and copied all of Healthcare's material that was produced
by the Wayback Machine.° The court looked to whether Harding
"copied more than was necessary and justifiable under the fair use
doctrine.' Thus, even though Harding printed everything that
was viewed on the Wayback Machine, the circumstances required
Harding to do so because it needed the printed copies as evidence
to defend its clients in court. Therefore, the court found that under
the circumstances, the amount and substantiality of Healthcare's
material that Harding copied was "necessary" and "justifiable"
under the fair use doctrine. 2 The court reasoned that Harding's
printing of the material was necessary to preserve evidence while
representing its client."
Under the fourth fair use factor, the court found that the impact
of Harding's viewing and copying had little impact upon the
44. Id.
45. Id. at 638.
46. Id.
47. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 638.
48. Id. (quoting Marshall Leaffer, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 436
(3d ed. 1999)).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 638.
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"potential market for or value of' Healthcare's copyrighted
work. 4 The court reasoned that because Healthcare's website is
used to promote and market Healthcare's services, the value of
Healthcare's website is based on the number of customers who
choose Healthcare's services as a result of viewing the website."
The court ruled that Harding used the screen shots in a lawsuit and
not as a competitor to Healthcare. 6 Thus, the court found that
Harding's use of Healthcare's material favored a finding of fair
use. 57
Ultimately, the court held that Harding's viewing and printing of
Healthcare's copyrighted material fell under the fair use doctrine
because all four of the fair use factors favored Harding. 8
B. Healthcare Was Not Entitled to a Spoliation Inference Despite
Harding's Failure to Preserve Temporary Computer Files
The court held that Healthcare was not entitled to a spoliation
inference at trial.59 Healthcare claimed that when Harding viewed
the screenshots, copies of the screenshots may have been
automatically saved into temporary cache files on Harding's
computers.6" Healthcare claimed that Harding had a duty to
preserve the cache files and that Healthcare was prejudiced
because Healthcare was not able to use the cache files as
evidence.6 The court ruled that a litigant is "under a duty to
preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in
the action, is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence, [or] is reasonably likely to be requested
during discovery. .". ."" Moreover, a spoliation inference may be
imposed when a party "has notice that evidence is relevant to
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 639.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 642.
60. Id. at 640.
61. Id. at 639.
62. Id. (quoting Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
2007] 227
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litigation and [that party] proceeds to destroy evidence."63 Thus,
destruction of evidence infers that a party was "more likely to have
been threatened by that evidence than [a] party in the same
position who does not destroy the evidence."64  To determine
whether sanctions should be imposed on Harding the court
considered three factors: (1) "the degree of fault" attributable to
Harding, (2) "the degree of prejudice suffered" by Healthcare, and
(3) "whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid substantial
unfairness to [Healthcare.]"65
Under the first factor, the court held that Harding was not at
fault for the loss of the temporary cache files.66 Healthcare
claimed that Harding immediately knew of its duty to preserve the
cache files when Harding saw that certain screenshots were
blocked and were unauthorized for viewing.67 The court ruled that
it was unreasonable for Harding to anticipate that using a public
website would subject them to a civil lawsuit.6 Moreover,
Harding did not affirmatively destroy the temporary cache files
because these files were automatically deleted by the computer.69
Under the second factor, the court also held that Healthcare had
not suffered significant prejudice from the loss of the temporary
cache files.7" Healthcare claimed that its investigation into
Harding's conduct was limited because the cache files were
unavailable.7' Because experts were able to reconstruct Harding's
conduct from available evidence, the court reasoned that
Healthcare had suffered little prejudice resulting from the lost
cache files.72
Under the third factor, the court held that sanctions against
Harding were unnecessary.73 The court found that Harding had
63. Id. (quoting Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 78 (3d
Cir. 1994)).
64. Id. (quoting Schmid, 13 F.3d at 78).
65. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 639-40 (citing Schmid, 13 F.3d at 79).
66. Id. at641.
67. Id. at 640.
68. Id.
69. Id. at641.
70. Id.
71. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 641.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 642.
228
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provided Healthcare forensic images of Harding's computer hard
drives.74 The court reasoned that Healthcare was able to obtain the
information it needed from these images.75 Moreover, the court
found it unreasonable to penalize Harding for failing to preserve
cache files that may have been immediately deleted once another
website was visited on that computer.76
C. Harding Did Not Violate the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
by Circumventing Healthcare's Technology Measure
The court held that Harding did not circumvent Healthcare's
technology measure in violation of the DMCA. 7  The DMCA
states that it is a violation of copyright if a person tries to
circumvent a "technology measure" that controls access to a
copyrighted work. 7' A "technology measure" controls access to a
copyrighted work if, in order to gain access to the work, the
measure requires an "application of information, or a process or a
treatment" that is authorized by the copyright owner.
The court held that Healthcare's robots.txt protocol was a
technology measure under the DMCA. 0 The court reasoned that
although the protocol is unlike a password or encryption security
measure, the protocol does block users from accessing archived
screenshots of Healthcare's website.8" The court ruled that the
protocol qualified as a technology measure because the only way
to gain access to Healthcare's copyrighted material would be for
Healthcare to remove the protocol.82
The court also held that Harding did not circumvent
Healthcare's robots.txt protocol.8 3 The court looked to whether
Harding "descramble[d], decrypt[ed], avoid[ed], bypass[ed],
remove[d], deactivate[d], or impair[ed]" Healthcare's robots.txt
74. Id. at 641.
75. Id. at 642.
76. Id. at 641-42.
77. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 646.
78. Id. at 642-43 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006)).
79. Id. at 643 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)B)).
80. Id. at 644.
81. Id. at643.
82. Id. at 644.
83. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 645.
2007]
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protocol.84 In addition, the court looked to whether Harding
"affirmatively perform[ed] an action that disable[d] or void[ed]"
the robots.txt protocol.85 The court found that on the dates
Harding used the Wayback Machine, the Wayback Machine
servers were malfunctioning.86 According to expert testimony, the
Wayback Machine servers failed to recognize the robots.txt
protocol and delivered Healthcare's protected work as if no
technology measure was in place.87 Thus, the court reasoned that
Harding could not have circumvented a protective measure
because nothing stood in the way of Harding from viewing
Healthcare's copyrighted work.88
The court also held that Harding did not circumvent
Healthcare's measure even though Harding may have known that
it was not authorized to view Healthcare's copyrighted work.89
According to Harding employees, some of Healthcare's
screenshots were blocked when they used the Wayback Machine.9"
The Wayback Machine also returned a message to the Harding
employees stating that the website owner had blocked the
images.9 Harding employees submitted further requests to view
the Healthcare images and ultimately viewed and printed
Healthcare images that were not blocked.92 Healthcare claimed
that Harding had circumvented Healthcare's technology measure
because Harding continued to request for Healthcare's images
despite knowing that certain images were not authorized for
viewing.93  The court reasoned that lack of Healthcare's
authorization is not considered as circumvention under the DMCA
even if Harding knew that Healthcare had not authorized access to
Healthcare's screenshots.94  According to the court, making
requests to view archived screenshots, even if some requests are
84. Id. at 644 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A)).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 646.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 645.
94. Id. at 646.
230
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denied, was not avoiding or bypassing a technology measure.95
D. Harding Did Not Violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by
Intentionally Exceeding Their Authorized Access
The court held that Harding did not intentionally exceed their
authorized access when Harding viewed Healthcare's copyrighted
material through the Wayback Machine.96 The CFAA makes it a
crime to "intentionally access a computer without authorization, or
exceed authorization, and thereby obtain information from any
protected computer if the conduct involved interstate or foreign
communication."97 A user exceeds their authorization when they
use their authorized access to obtain information stored in the
computer that they are not entitled to.9" A civil action may be
brought if the computer, which was used to cause the victim harm,
was used in interstate commerce.99 Moreover, the victim must
show that they suffered an aggregate loss of at least $5000' oo that
was spent towards "responding to the offense, conducting a
damage assessment, and restoring the data, program system, or
information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue
lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damage incurred because
of interruption of service."'' 1
The court held that Healthcare could bring a CFAA claim
against Harding because Harding accessed a computer that was
used in interstate commerce and because Healthcare suffered at
least $5000 in harm.'02 Even though Healthcare's computers were
not directly accessed by Harding, the court reasoned that Harding
accessed computers used in interstate commerce and that access
caused Healthcare harm.' 3 The court held that the Wayback
Machine servers were used in interstate commerce because
Harding, located in Pennsylvania, accessed the Wayback Machine
95. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 646.
96. Id. at 649.
97. Id. at 646 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2006)).
98. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6)).
99. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B)).
100. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i)).
101. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 647 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1 1)).
102. Id. at 647-48.
103. Id at 647.
2007]
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servers that were located in California.' °4 Moreover, the court
found that Healthcare showed that it had suffered at least $5000
towards assessing the integrity of their website and in determining
how Harding obtained the protected materials. '05
The court held that Harding did not intentionally exceed their
authorized access in order to obtain Healthcare's copyrighted
material.' 6 To determine whether Harding violated the CFAA, the
court looked to whether Harding accessed a computer with
authorization and used their access to obtain information that they
were not entitled to see.'07 Because the CFAA focuses on criminal
conduct, the court also ruled that Harding must have intentionally
viewed Healthcare's screenshots that Harding was not entitled to
view. "'
The court found that Harding viewed Healthcare's protected
material by submitting requests to the Wayback Machine.' 9 The
Wayback Machine would return a list of dates with each date
serving as a link to a Healthcare screenshot."' At times, a link
would take the Harding employee to a web page showing a
blocked screenshot and the user would be informed that they were
unauthorized to view the screenshot."' When a blocked
screenshot was presented, the Harding employee would go back to
the list of dates and would continue searching for a screenshot that
was not blocked."2  The court reasoned that Harding did not
exceed their authorized use because the Wayback Machine was a
public website and Harding used the website in the "manner it was
intended to be used.""' Unlike a person that steals information off
a public website with special software," 4 or a person that transmits
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 649.
107. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 648 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6)
(2006)).
108. Id. (citing United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 508 (2d Cir. 1991)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 648.
114. Id. at 649 (citing Southwest Airlines v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d
435, 439-40 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (holding valid claim under CFAA against person
232
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a worm into a computer system, "5 Harding had not used any
special tools to view Healthcare's screenshots.116 The court found
that Harding submitted requests using an ordinary web browser
and viewed information the Wayback Machine provided."' Even
though Harding viewed Healthcare's material without Healthcare's
permission, Harding did not intentionally exceed their
authorization to view the material. "8 Harding was able to view
Healthcare's material only because the Wayback Machine servers
had malfunctioned. ",9
E. Healthcare's State Law Claims for Conversion and Trespass to
Chattels Were Preempted by Federal Copyright Law
The court held that Healthcare's common law conversion and
trespass to chattels claims were preempted by federal copyright
law. 2 ° To determine preemption the court looked to whether the
"state cause of action requires an extra element, beyond mere
copying, preparation of derivative works, performance,
distribution or display ... '.1" If an extra element is found, the
federal law does not preempt the state action.'22 Thus, "all
common law or state law rights that are equivalent to the rights
available under copyright protections are preempted."'2 3 The court
found that both a trespass to chattel and conversion claim under
Pennsylvania law required an "intermeddling" or "interference"
with another person's chattel.'24 The court reasoned that the rights
available under these state laws were equivalent to rights under
federal copyright law.'25 Thus, to establish a trespass to chattel or
who used scraping software to steal website information)).
115. Id. (citing United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 508 (2d Cir. 1991)).
116. See id. at 648.
117. Id. at 649.
118. Id.
119. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 649.
120. Id. at 650.
121. Id. (quoting Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc., v. Grace
Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 217 (3d Cir. 2002)).
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006)).
124. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965)).
125. Healthcare, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 650.
2007] 233
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a conversion claim required "nothing more than what is required
under copyright law to establish infringement." 1
2 6
IV. CONCLUSION
The court held that (1) Harding's viewing and printing of
Healthcare's past websites fell under the fair use doctrine,'27 (2)
Harding did not circumvent Healthcare's technology measure,' 28
(3) Harding did not intentionally exceed their authorized access
when using the Wayback Machine,'29 and (4) Healthcare's state
law claims for conversion and trespass to chattels were preempted
by federal copyright law. 30
Xavier P. Diokno
126. Id.
127. Id. at 639.
128. Id. at 646.
129. Id. at 649.
130. Id. at 650.
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